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O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar a infl uência da jurisdição do Tribunal Constitucional Federal Alemão, 
chamado Bundesverfassungsgericht, na Integração Europeia. Com base na análise de três decisões marco, 
fi cará evidente que a partir do ponto de vista da lei constitucional nenhuma integração supranacional 
posterior pode levar à criação de um Estado Federal Europeu que deixe a Alemanha sem “substância de 
estado”. Além disso, o princípio da democracia, com garantia permanente na constituição alemã, seria 
violado pela criação de um mecanismo permanente de responsabilidade solidária por tempo indeterminado 
na Europa.  Esta “linha vermelha” estabelecida pelo Tribunal precisa ser a diretriz da política alemã em 
suas futuras negociações sobre maior Integração Europeia.
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ABSTRACT
The objective of this article is to describe the impact of the jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, on European Integration. Based on three landmark decisions, it is 
clear that from a perspective of constitutional law, no further supranational integration can lead to the 
creation of a European Federal State, leaving Germany without “state substance”. Furthermore, the principle 
of democracy, eternally guaranteed by the German constitution, would be violated by the creation of a 
permanent mechanism of indefi nite joint liability in Europe. This “red line” stipulated by the Court has to 
be the guideline for German politics in its future negotiations on further European Integration.              
KEYWORDS: European Integration. German Constitution. Principle of Democracy.
RESUMEN
El objetivo de este artículo es plantear la infl uencia de la jurisdicción del Tribunal Constitucional Federal 
Alemán, denominado Bundesverfassungsgericht, en la Integración Europea. En base al análisis de tres 
decisiones marco resultará evidente que, desde el punto de vista de la ley constitucional, ninguna integración 
supranacional posterior puede llevar a la creación de un Estado Federal Europeo que deje a Alemania 
sin “sustancia de estado”. Además de ello, el principio de la democracia, con garantía permanente en 
la constitución alemana, sería violado por la creación de un mecanismo permanente de responsabilidad 
solidaria por tiempo indeterminado en Europa. Esta “línea roja” establecida por el Tribunal necesita ser la 
directriz de la política alemana en sus futuras negociaciones sobre una mayor Integración Europea.
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1 RELEVANCE OF THE QUESTION
Speaking of European Integration, one might come to the conclusion that it is merely a 
question of “politics”. Political summits dominate the picture and the newspapers report on political 
compromises that have been achieved – if indeed there are any such achievements. Consequently, 
the fi nal outcome of integration, the extent of supranational power, even the creation of the “United 
States of Europe” seem to be dependent on the respective “political will” to act. However, this does 
not properly refl ect the legal situation: 
Firstly, the European Union is a supranational entity created by law and ruled by law, meaning 
the European Treaties, particularly the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”)2 and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).3 However, the Union is not a “state” as such. 
A state is defi ned by an original competence, the so-called power-of-power, which enables it to 
take care of any issue which might arise in its territory with respect to its citizens. The European 
Union, by contrast, is only entitled to act on powers which have been conferred upon Union 
level in the Treaties. This tremendously important “principle of conferral” is explicitly provided 
in Article 5 (1) and (2) TEU1.   
Consequently, any further European integration not contained in or intended by the Treaties 
in their present form must be provided for by a unanimous amendment of the Treaties, Article 48 
TEU.4 Thus, the political agreement between the governments of the 27 Member States is in fact 
necessary, but not suffi cient as such.        
Secondly, the transfer of sovereign rights to the Union level has an impact on the constitution 
of any Member State. As far as Germany is concerned, such transfer must be legally admissible in 
terms of the German Grundgesetz (“Basic Law”), as the German Constitution is called. 
Compliance with the boundaries of the Basic Law is monitored by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (“the Court”), in German the Bundesverfassungsgericht, with headquarters in 
the city of Karlsruhe and established sixty years ago in 1951, i.e. only six years after the end of World 
War II and two years, after the Grundgesetz entered into effect. It is the “Guard of Constitution”. In 
this article, I will explain the impact of this “guard-watch” on the question of further integration. 
2 THE ROLE OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT
As ”Guard of Constitution“, the Bundesverfassungsgericht consisting of sixteen judges in 
two “senates” is entitled to control – under certain formal conditions – all state measures by the 
standards of the Grundgesetz. This has been particularly important with respect to the basic rights 
and the principle of democracy, as well as the rule of law, pursuant to Articles 1 through 20 of the 
Basic Law. The Court can even declare Acts of Parliament in breach of the Grundgesetz null and 
void. This particularly strong position – even vis-à-vis the legislative power – is to be seen in light 
of the negative experiences during the Nazi era. Never again should it be possible, either for the 
Parliament itself or for any other authorities, to undermine basic laws and violate human dignity. In 
other words: There should be no power without limits.5 In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to 
say that in Germany, any “big” legal or social issue whatsoever is likely to “reach Karlsruhe” in the 
end. The consciousness of the German public in regard to the rule of law has been deeply shaped 
by the rulings of this Court.  “Famous” decisions concern everybody’s life and are vividly and often 
controversially discussed.6 Its mission and its decisions – even if they were contrary to the “public 
1 Article 5 TEU (ex Article 5 TEC).
   The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use 
of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 
Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.
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opinion” – have made the Bundesverfassungsgericht a well-established authority in Germany, still 
holding the trust of the vast majority of the population.         
For a rather long time, the Court even claimed the right to monitor legal measures adopted at 
a European level, and to decide on the validity of the respective national transformation acts as the 
“last instance” for the German public. Clearly, this was in contrast to the opinion of the European 
Court of Justice (“ECJ”). The struggle for power between the ECJ and the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
lessened, however, from the year 1986 on, when the Court fi nally accepted the European law as 
superior – superior even to the German Constitution – ‘as long as the basic rights were generally 
guarded by the European Communities, in particular by the ECJ, in a comparable manner as the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht used to do’.7 
Today, the Bundesverfassungsgericht is widely deemed to be the second most influential 
Court in the European Union apart from the ECJ, and calls its relationship to the ECJ 
“cooperative”8 However, this view is neither defined in detail by the Court itself nor particularly 
welcomed by the ECJ. In the text that follows, we will look briefly at the background to this 
‘relationship of cooperation’.
3 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND GERMAN BASIC LAW 
3.1 The Basic Law is “Integration-Friendly” 
As stated above, the transfer of sovereign rights to the Union level has always had an impact 
on the constitution of a Member State. In Germany, this transfer of powers was explicitly made 
admissible in 1992 – in the context of the Treaty of Maastricht – by amending the constitution 
through a newly-shaped Art. 23.9 The current version reads:
Article 23 (1) Basic Law10        
With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate 
in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal 
principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of 
protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end 
the federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat.11 The 
establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in its treaty foundations and comparable 
regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or make such amendments or supplements 
possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79. 
However, although generally admissible, the limits of this transfer of powers are already indicated 
in this very Article, when it refers to Article 79 of the Basic Law. Below, I will deal with three “landmark 
decisions” of the Court that have shaped this “red line” for further integration.    
3.2 The Limits of Integration – Landmark Decisions 
3.2.1 “Maastricht” and “Lisbon” Proceedings: An Overview
The so-called “Maastricht – Decision”12 of 12th October 1993 concerns the Act of Parliament 
that approved the Treaty of Maastricht,13 which established the European Union, the “three pillar 
concept” and – most importantly – introduced the Economic and Monetary Union. Signed by the 
Member States’ representatives on 7th of February 1992, it still had to be ratifi ed. Unlike Denmark, 
Ireland and France, no referendum was required in Germany. Instead, the afore-mentioned Article 
23 Grundgesetz was made use of, i.e. (only) the Parliament had to approve the Treaty. It is no 
secret that politics in Germany was not ‘unhappy’ about the fact that it did not require a positive 
referendum, since the population was not particularly favorable to the idea of monetary union and 
the abolition of the Deutsche Mark, despite the continual promises of the ruling politicians that the 
Euro would be as stable as the Deutsche Mark.14 
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Following the Parliamentary approval in December 1992, the only recourse left to the opponents 
of  monetary union was to fi le a complaint to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, claiming that the transfer 
of powers in the Treaty was not compatible with the Basic Law, since it violated the sovereignty of 
the German State in an impermissible manner. 
The Court fi nally confi rmed the compatibility of the Maastricht Treaty with the Basic Law, 
emphasizing, in particular, the principle of conferral in Article 5 (2) TEU.15 However, one cannot 
assume that the Court did not identify any legal problems. On the contrary, it outlined boundaries of 
the Basic Law regarding future integration, which it confi rmed, further developed, and explained in 
detail in its “Lisbon – Decision” in 2009.  Therefore, I shall fi rst briefl y address the background and 
circumstances of this second important decision, before going on to discuss those boundaries. 
In the “Lisbon-Decision”16 of 30th June 2009, the Bundesverfassungsgericht found the Treaty of 
Lisbon17 to be in conformity with the Basic Law. Similar to the Maastricht proceedings, the applicants 
claimed the transfer of powers in the Treaty of Lisbon would grant the European Union a state-like 
legal status, and abolish the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign state, thereby violating 
the principle of democracy. And in fact the Treaty of Lisbon again reformed the EU to a great extent, 
even if the Treaty – after negative referendums in France and the Netherlands – was no longer 
named the “European Constitution”: It dissolved the European Union’s “three pillar concept” and 
the European Union – now gaining legal personality – succeeded the European Community (Article 
1.3 and 47 TEU). Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon made majority voting in the Council the norm, 
introduced a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, strengthened 
the role of the European Parliament (Article 14 (1) TEU2; Article 289 (1) TFEU3), transferred further 
competences to the Union, and transferred matters that were formerly only the jurisdiction of 
intergovernmental co-operation, such as justice and home affairs, to the supranational level. A 
further step in supranational integration, and a huge one at that. 
However, the Court nonetheless allowed the Treaty to be passed. In its 147-page ruling, it stressed the 
principle of conferral as it had already done in its Maastricht decision. Despite all the powers transferred 
to the Union level, the Union did not grant a power-of-power. The German state was therefore not about 
to be abolished. In describing why the Treaty of Lisbon was not in breach of the Basic Law, the Court 
did, however, at the same time, set out limits, when such incompatibility of integration with the Basic 
Law would in fact occur. Below, I summarize the most important aspects thus far, in my opinion. 
3.2.2 Limits of Integration as set out in the Maastricht and Lisbon Rulings 
Further Integrat ion leaving no “substance” to Germany, and in part icular 
to the German Parliament, violates the principle of democracy 
The core issue of both the Maastricht and the Lisbon ruling is the principle of democracy, 
embedded in Article 20 Basic Law and absolutely inadmissible according to Art. 79 (3) Basic Law 
(the so-called “eternity guarantee”).18 
In accordance with this principle the German people are – still – the sole holder of constituent 
power. However,  constituent power, executed by the right to vote, would in the end become 
meaningless if no place were given for the national political formation of the economic, cultural 
and social circumstances in life.19 The Court stated (I have added the English translation below the 
original German text):20
Die Wahl der deutschen Abgeordneten durch das Volk erfüllt nur dann ihre tragende Rolle im 
System föderaler und supranationaler Herrschaftsverfl echtung, wenn der das Volk repräsentierende 
2  Article 14 (TEU).
 The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. 
It shall exercise functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the Treaties. It shall elect 
the President of the Commission.
3  Article 289 (TFEU).
 The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and 
the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission. This procedure 
is defi ned in Article 294.
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Deutsche Bundestag und die von ihr getragene Bundesregierung einen gestaltenden Einfl uss auf 
die politische Entwicklung in Deutschland behalten. Das ist dann der Fall, wenn der Deutsche 
Bundestag eigene Aufgaben und Befugnisse von substanziellem politischen Gewicht behält 
oder die ihm politisch verantwortliche Bundesregierung maßgeblichen Einfl uss auf europäische 
Entscheidungsverfahren auszuüben vermag […].21 
The election of the Members of the German Bundestag22 by the people fulfi ls its central role in 
the system of the federal and supranational intertwining of power only if the German Bundestag, 
which represents the people, and the Federal Government sustained by it, retain a formative 
infl uence on the political development in Germany. This is the case if the German Bundestag 
retains own responsibilities and competences of substantial political importance or if the Federal 
Government, which is answerable to it politically, is in a position to exert a decisive infl uence on 
European decision-making procedures […].
The ”state quality“ of the European Union is not compatible with the Basic Law
Based on the concept of the German people as a constituent power, it is a matter of mere 
consequence that the Court continues its rulings, pointing out that the transfer of a power-of-power 
to the Union level would be in breach of the Basic Law:
Das Grundgesetz ermächtigt die für Deutschland handelnden Organe nicht, durch einen 
Eintritt in einen Bundesstaat das Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Deutschen Volkes in Gestalt der 
völkerrechtlichen Souveränität Deutschlands aufzugeben. Dieser Schritt ist wegen der mit ihm 
verbundenen unwiderrufl ichen Souveränitätsübertragung auf ein neues Legitimitätssubjet allein 
dem unmittelbar erklärten Willen des Deutschen Volkes vorbehalten.23 
The Basic Law does not grant powers to bodies acting on behalf of Germany to abandon the 
right to self-determination of the German people in the form of Germany’s sovereignty under 
international law by joining a federal state. Due to the irrevocable transfer of sovereignty to a 
new subject of legitimation that goes with it, this step is reserved to the directly declared will 
of the German people alone.
With this, the Court clearly states that a creation of the “Federal States of Europe” is not an 
admissible objective in terms of the Basic Law, but requires the “directly declared will of the German 
people”, i.e. a referendum, pursuant to Article 146 of the Basic Law.   
Article 146 of the Basic Law       
This Basic Law, which is valid for the entire German people following the achievement of the 
unity and freedom in Germany, shall cease to be in force on the day on which a constitution 
adopted by the free decision of the German people comes into force.         
In other words: There are no boundaries for transferring sovereign rights to the Union level; 
even the power-of-power may be transferred, provided this abolition of the German State identity 
is approved by the German people in a referendum, replacing the existing Basic Law and its limits. 
However, a referendum in Germany is not likely to happen in the near future, for reasons that are 
not addressed in this article.  
Ultra-vires control by the German Court, should EU measures exceed the 
competences granted by the Treaties 
Apart from the afore-said, the Court stresses the meaning of the principle of conferral for the 
validity of European legal measures. Provided the European authorities act within the powers validly 
transferred to them in the European Treaties, the superiority of European law vis-à-vis national law 
is legally justifi ed by this very transfer. 
That means, however, that any European legal measure that exceeds the transferred 
powers – i.e. is “ultra vires” - cannot be considered applicable in Germany. For this reason, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht reserves the right to assess such inapplicability, i.e. the right to control 
whether the European authorities are acting “off-limits”.24 
It comes as no surprise then, that this opinion might lead to confl icts, in view of Article 263 of the 
TFEU, which states that it is the task of the ECJ, and not of the national courts, to decide on these 
matters. Meanwhile however, perhaps as a reaction of this criticism, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
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“downsized” its approach to a kind of “evidence control”, leaving a wide scope of interpretation 
to the ECJ25 and thereby shaping the relationship of cooperation it had already mentioned in the 
Maastricht judgment.26 And in the “Euro-Decision” explained below, the Court, interestingly enough, 
did not take the opportunity to examine whether the “Euro rescue” actions at Union and Member 
State levels had in fact violated Article 123 and the “no bail-out” of Article 125 of the TFEU.27       
3.2.3 Constitutional Boundaries aff ecting fi nancial assistance in the Euro-Crisis, the 
Court’s ”Euro- Decision“ of 7 September 201128 
The third “landmark decision” discussed in this Article concerns German Acts of Parliament 
granting authority to the German government to provide fi nancial aid to Greece, and to give 
guarantees to the European Financial Stability Facility (“EFSF”) amounting, in total, to approximately 
€ 170 billion. The Bundesverfassungsgericht had to decide whether these Acts had been adopted 
in accordance with the Basic Law.       
Core issue: Budgetary right of Parliament
The Court, in principle, agreed with the applicants that under certain circumstances, the principle 
of democracy could be violated by the assumption of guarantees:
The budgetary right is a core competence of any parliament in a democracy. Thus, if the budgetary 
right of Parliament is virtually rendered completely ineffective by the amount of guarantees involved, 
it is impaired in a constitutionally impermissible manner.29 In other words: If the Parliament elected 
by the constituent power – i.e. the German people – has or will have nothing to decide upon, since 
there is actually no “free” budget to distribute, the principle of democracy and the democratic right 
to vote, becomes a mere formality and is therefore violated.      
However, in the case in question, the Court did not yet recognize – accepting a relatively wide 
prerogative of the legislative power – such a strangling effect of the assumed risk of € 170 billion 
to future German Parliaments.30     
No “general power” by the German Parliament 
The Court particularly strengthened and stressed the role of Parliament: Any authorization 
granted by the Bundestag to give guarantees to third parties must be largely defi ned, such as the 
defi nite amount of possible guarantees and the fundamental modalities. Suffi cient parliamentary 
infl uence must also be guaranteed, with regard to the way the funds that are made available are 
dealt with.31 Any kind of “general power” to the government is in breach of the Basic Law. Thus, 
the Court not only strengthened but also appealed to the Parliament: It must take its responsibility 
seriously and is not allowed to simply leave “diffi cult economic topics” to the government or even 
the fi nancial markets.  
No permanent European mechanism automatically resulting in a liability of Germany
As a consequence of the afore-said, any establishment of a permanent mechanism that results 
in an assumption of liability for the voluntary decisions of another State, especially if they have 
consequences whose impact is diffi cult to calculate, is prohibited.32 Thus, the Parliament is prevented 
from shifting its responsibility not only to the national government, but to any third party whatsoever. 
This explicitly means a disapproval of any automatic indefi nite “liability union” of the Member States 
within the European framework.  
4 CONSEQUENCES FOR FURTHER INTEGRATION
The consequences of the jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitutional Court for further 
supranational integration in Europe are tremendous, as far as the German membership is concerned. 
The Court’s President Andreas Voßkuhle made this startlingly clear when he said in an interview, 
subsequent to the Euro-Decision, that the admissible scope of integration based on the Grundgesetz 
had already widely been used.33  
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A European Union as a federal state leaving no powers of substance to the Member States, 
affecting the identity of the German State as shaped by its present Constitution, cannot be based 
on Article 23 of the Basic Law. However, should politics decide to take this further step, and agree 
to shift core competences and the substance of the German national State’s identity, such as dues 
and taxes, criminal justice, police and military issues or the structure of the welfare system to the 
Union level, this would only be permissible through a positive vote by the German people, in a 
referendum. 
5 JURISDICTION OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT AND EURO-CRISIS 
5.1 Strangling Eff ect of Increasingly Higher Guarantees?
The Euro Decision referred to above will, most likely, not be the last one in this respect. On 
September 29, 2011 the German Parliament gave its consent to even higher German guarantees 
to the EFSF, this time amounting to € 211 billion. (plus a 20% “reserve”) instead of € 123 billion.34 
The question is,  when will the guarantees, and therefore the risk, be “high enough” to strangle the 
budgetary right of future German Parliaments and therefore violate the principle of democracy in 
the sense of the “Euro-Decision”?
5.2 Economic and Financial Union Violating the Basic Law?
Another, perhaps even more important issue concerns the European Member States’ or at least 
the “Euro” States’ cooperation in the fi eld of economic and fi nancial policy. It is common knowledge 
that the introduction of a monetary union without a real economic and fi nancial union was – from 
an economic point of view – a very dangerous decision from the start. Actually, all the fears of the 
applicants in the Maastricht Decision – very interesting to read these days – proved to be well-
founded. However, the introduction of the monetary union was a political decision in the fi rst place, 
with politics hoping that the “stability arrangements” agreed upon and based on (now) Article 126 
of the TFEU would make it work in the long run. It is clear that it did not work, for reasons outside 
the scope of this article. 
What is the impact of the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht mentioned above in the 
present situation?    
Looking at the different propositions to solve the Euro crisis, more economic and fi nancial 
cooperation between at least the “Euro”-States within the European Union is the most likely scenario. 
Whereas a pure intergovernmental cooperation bears relatively low risks to exceed the limits of the 
German Basic Law, the picture changes dramatically with a supranational perspective, as stipulated, for 
example, by José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, considering the Commission 
as the only – true – “economic government of the Union” and thereby encroaching a core competence 
of any sovereign state. Promoting the model of an extensive supranational integration, the issue of 
joint debt (so-called “Euro-bonds”) appears, from this perspective, to be a “natural and advantageous 
step for all concerned”.35 Considering the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, such 
joint liability is likely – depending on its details – to cross the “red line” in terms of German Basic Law, 
as it would represent the forbidden permanent mechanism of indefi nite joint liability.36                  
SUMMARY
In summary, the judgments of the Bundesverfassungsgericht have had, and will continue to 
have, an impact on European Integration, even with respect to the present and future handling of 
the Euro crisis. Given the likelihood of further amendments to the European Treaties, in order to 
foster a closer economic and fi nancial cooperation between the Member States, the Court will keep 
an eye on German politics when negotiating a transfer of budgetary rights to Union level, and the 
future of the Euro. 
Kerstin Schweizer - A integração europeia e o papel do ...302
ISSN Eletrônico 2175-0491 
REFERENCES
Barroso, European Renewal.  State of the Union Address 2011. European Parliament Strasbourg, 28 
Sept. 2011, www.europa.eu, speech/11/607.   
European Union. Decision 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92 of Oct. 12, 1993 (“Maastricht”), NJW 
1993, 3047.
_____. Decision 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 of Oct. 12, 1993 (“Maastricht”), NJW 1993, 
3047.
_____. Decision 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92 of Oct. 12, 1993 (“Maastricht”), NJW 1993, 
3047.
_____. Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267. 
_____. Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267, 2273/4, section 
249. The English language version of the decision is published at http://www.bverfg.de. 
_____. Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267, 2273, section 
246; 
_____. Decision 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92 of Oct. 12, 1993 (“Maastricht”), NJW 1993, 
3047. 
_____.  Euro-Decision of the Court, see note 28, sections 121 pp.
_____.  Euro-Decision of the Court, see note 28, sections 132 through 135. 
_____.  Euro-Decision of the Court, see note 28, sections 125 pp, 128.
_____.  Offi cial Journal. Consolidated version: (OJ) C 83/13 of 30 March 2010.
_____.  Offi cial Journal. Consolidated version: (OJ) C 83/47 of 30 March 2010.
_____. Treaty , Offi cial Journal of the European Union (OJ) C 191 of 29 July 1992.
_____. Treaty of Lisbon, Offi cial Journal of the European Union (OJ) C 306/01 of 17 Dec. 2007.
German Constitution.  In connection with § 8 of the German Integrationsverantwortungsge-
setz. 
German Court . As Herdegen, Europarecht, 13th ed., § 10, 28. puts it: ECJ had been granted by the 
German 
_____. Decision 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10 of Sept. 7, 2011 (“Euro”), see 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs201109072bvr 0987.10.html. An English language version of 
the Court’s press release may be found on www.bverfg.de as well.  
German Parliament. Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267, 2271, 
section 228.
_____. Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267, 2285, sections 
338, 339, 341. 
German re-unifi cation. Art. 23 had formerly been the Article and had thus become inapplicable after 
the re-unifi cation in fact occurred in1990. 
Kohl, Helmut. Debate in Parliament of April 23, 1998, Parliament Protocol, BT-Ds. 13/230: Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl. Meine Damen und Herren, nach der vertraglichen Regelung gibt es keine Haftung 
der Gemeinschaft für, 
Merkel, Angela. This function of the Court explicitly confi rming on the day of the 60th anniversary 
of the Court, Chancellor Angela Merkel in her speech held in Karlsruhe on September 28, 2011, to be 
found at http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de: “Absage an den politischen Allmachtsanspruch”.          
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, Decision 2 BvR 197/83 of Oct. 22, 1986 (“Solange II“), 1987, 577. 
303Revista NEJ - Eletrônica, Vol. 16 - n. 3 - p. 295-304 / set-dez 2011
Disponível em: www.univali.br/periodicos
Republic of Germany. Translation of the Basic Law used in this article edited by Deutscher Bund-
estag. „Basic. Law of the Federal Republic of Germany”. Version October 2010. 
_____. The Bundesrat represents the Bundesländer/federal states in Germany.
_____. Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the federation into Länder, their 
participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 
and 20 shall be inadmissible.
_____. Decision 2 BvR 2661/06 of July 6, 2010 (“Honeywell”), NJW 2010, 3422; more informa-
tion e.g. by Proelß, Zur verfassungsgerichtlichen Kontrolle der Kompetenzmäßigkeit von Maßnahmen der 
Europäischen Union: Der “ausbrechende Rechtsakt” in der Praxis des BVerfG, EuR (Europarecht), 2011, 
241, 246.   
_____. According to calculations of the Deutsche Bank, the liability, including interest, is even 
higher than this amount, i.e. approximately € 400 billion, as cited by Schäfers/Mussler. In: 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) / www.faz.net of 29.9.2011. 
Voßkuhle, Andreas. Interview with President of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung.  (FAZ) of Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30638/im-gespraech-andreas-
vosskuhle-mehr-europa-laesst-das-grundgesetz-kaum zu-30723509.html.




1 Kerstin Schweizer, Professor at Pforzheim University in Germany, working in the fi elds of economic 
and European law. E-mail: kerstin.schweizer@hs-pforzheim.de.
2 Consolidated version: Offi cial Journal of the European Union (OJ) C 83/13 of 30 March 2010. 
3 Consolidated version: Offi cial Journal of the European Union (OJ) C 83/47 of 30 March 2010.
4 Article 352 TFEU – the so-called fl exibility clause – might at fi rst sight be considered a “hidden” power-
of-power. However, not only the prerequisites of this article itself – in particular subpara. (3) and (4) 
– are impediments to this effect, but also, as far as Germany is concerned, any provision based on 
Art. 352 TFEU requires the consent of the German Parliament pursuant to Article 23 subpara. (1) of 
the German Constitution in connection with § 8 of the German Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz.       
5 This function of the Court explicitly confi rmed on the day of the 60th anniversary of the Court, Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel, in her speech held in Karlsruhe on September 28, 2011, which can be found at 
http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de: “Absage an den politischen Allmachtsanspruch”.    
6 Examples are the strengthening of the principle of equality of men and women, e.g. by abolishing the 
“dominant vote” of the father in childcare issues (1959), the creation of the “basic law of personal data 
protection” against spying by any spying (1983), which is an impediment even today for extensive 
“anti-terrorist” measures, the strengthening of “freedom of opinion” even between private parties 
(1958) and the decision of the Court that any ‘out of area mission’ of the German army requires the 
prior consent of the German Parliament (1994).      
7 Decision 2 BvR 197/83 of Oct. 22, 1986 (“Solange II”), Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (“NJW”) 1987, 
577. 
8 Decision 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 of Oct. 12, 1993 (“Maastricht”), NJW 1993, 3047.
9 Art. 23 had formerly been the “German re-unifi cation” article and had thus become inapplicable after 
the re-unifi cation in fact occurred 1990. It was seen as a matter of symbolism to replace just this very 
article by a provision of European unity.  
10 Translation of the Basic Law used in this article edited by Deutscher Bundestag, “Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany”, version October 2010. 
11 The Bundesrat represents the Bundesländer/federal states in Germany.
12 Decision 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92 of Oct. 12, 1993 (“Maastricht”), NJW 1993, 3047.
13 Treaty on European Union, Offi cial Journal of the European Union (OJ) C 191 of 29 July 1992.
Kerstin Schweizer - A integração europeia e o papel do ...304
ISSN Eletrônico 2175-0491 
14 Debate in Parliament on April 23, 1998, Parliamentary Protocol, BT-Ds. 13/230: Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl: “Meine Damen und Herren, nach der vertraglichen Regelung gibt es keine Haftung der Gemein-
schaft für Verbindlichkeiten der Mitgliedstaaten und keine zusätzlichen Finanztransfers”; Minister of 
Finance Theo Waigel: “Jedes Land haftet alleine für seine Schulden. Es wird in der Währungsunion 
keine zusätzlichen Finanztransfers geben. Haftungsübernahmen seitens der Gemeinschaft oder an-
derer Teilnehmerstaaten sind ausgeschlossen. […] Die Währungsunion ist als Stabilitätsgemeinschaft 
konzipiert, die vorrangig die Preisstabilität zu gewährleisten hat”.  
15 Decision 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92 of Oct. 12, 1993 (“Maastricht”), NJW 1993, 3047.
16 Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267. 
17 Treaty of Lisbon, Offi cial Journal of the European Union (OJ) C 306/01 of 17 Dec. 2007.
18 Article 79 (3) of the Basic Law reads: “Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the 
federation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid 
down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.”
19 Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267, 2273/4, section 249. As ex-
amples the Court named the fi elds of citizenship, civil and military forces, budget topics, education 
system and the like. 
20 The English language version of the decision is published on http://www.bverfg.de. 
21 Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267, 2273, section 246; Decision 
2 BvR 2134/92 and 2 BvR 2159/92 of Oct. 12, 1993 (“Maastricht”), NJW 1993, 3047. 
22 Name of the German Parliament. 
23 Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267, 2271, section 228.
24 Decision 2 BvE 2/08 a.o. of June 30, 2009 (“Lisbon”), NJW 2009, 2267, 2285, sections 338, 339, 
341. 
25 As Herdegen, Europarecht, 13th ed., § 10, 28 puts it: ECJ had been granted an “Anspruch auf Fehler-
toleranz” by the German Court.  
26 Decision 2 BvR 2661/06 of July 6, 2010 (“Honeywell”), NJW 2010, 3422; more information e.g. by 
Proelß, Zur verfassungsgerichtlichen Kontrolle der Kompetenzmäßigkeit von Maßnahmen der Europäis-
chen Union: Der “ausbrechende Rechtsakt” in der Praxis des BVerfG, EuR (Europarecht), 2011, 241, 
246.   
27 This very question had been discussed in the (legal) literature for months, and it was widely expected 
that the Court would confi rm a breach of the TFEU. However, the Court chose not to do so.       
28 Decision 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10 of Sept. 7, 2011 (“Euro”), see http://www.
bverfg. de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_2bvr0987.10.html. An English language version of the 
Court’s press release can be found at www.bverfg.de as well.  
29 “Euro” - Decision of the Court, see note 28, sections 121 pp.
30 “Euro” - Decision of the Court, see note 28, sections 132 through 135. 
31 “Euro” - Decision of the Court, see note 28, sections 125 pp, 128.
32 “Euro” - Decision of the Court, see note 28, sections 125 pp, 128. 
33 Interview in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) of Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.faz.net/artikel/
C30638/im-gespraech-andreas-vosskuhle-mehr-europa-laesst-das-grundgesetz-kaum zu-30723509.
html. 
34 According to calculations of the Deutsche Bank, the liability including interests even exceeds this 
amount, i.e. appr. € 400 billion., as cited by Schäfers/Mussler, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(FAZ) / www.faz.net of 29.9.2011. 
35 Barroso, European Renewal – State of the Union Address 2011 / European Parliament Strasbourg, 28 
Sept. 2011, www.europa.eu, speech/11/607.   
36 Interview with Andreas Voßkuhle, President of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, in Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ) of Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30638/im-gespraech-andreas-vosskuhle-
mehr-europa-laesst-das-grundgesetz-kaum zu-30723509.html.
